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governments use excise taxes to a much smaller
extent. State and local governments also use cor-
porate income and other business taxes, construc-
tion and property transfer taxes, severance taxes,
inheritance and gift taxes, unemployment insur-
ance taxes, and others.
The significant revenue declines for state (and
to a lesser extent, local) governments during fiscal
years (FYs) 2009 and 2010 have motivated many
governmental entities to expand current revenue
sources and search for new ones. Some have con-
tinued to seek greater productivity from the larger
sources. For example, at least 10 states have raised
their income tax rate and 9 states have increased
their sales tax rate since the beginning of 2009.
But states are also seeking alternatives to the three
large taxes, either in hopes that other taxes will be
more stable or because it may be politically easier
S
tate and local governments generate a
substantial majority of their tax revenues
from three sources: property, general
sales, and personal income taxes. These
three sources are responsible for 76.1 percent of
total state and local tax revenue. State government
taxes are more diverse, raising only 68.3 percent
of revenue from these sources, whereas local
governments obtain 87.7 percent of revenue from
them (Figures 1 and 2). In fact, local governments
raise a larger revenue share from property taxes
alone than states do from the combination of the
three taxes.
The remaining state and local government
revenue sources include several tax instruments,
most of which individually provide relatively little
revenue. Excise taxes on alcohol, beer, gasoline,
tobacco, and gambling are responsible for at least
16 percent of revenue at the state level, but these
represent a large group of different taxes, not a
single tax on each of these five sources.1 Local
State governments are much more likely than their local counterparts to depend on taxes other
than sales, property, and personal income taxes. Excises on alcohol, beer, tobacco, gambling, and
business taxes are among the alternative taxes. Local governments, on the other hand, are more
likely to impose user fees. Reliance on these alternative state tax sources in aggregate has dimin-
ished over the past several decades, despite a pattern of rate increases and new gambling alterna-
tives. Competitive pressures between states and with the federal government are likely to continue
limiting reliance on these alternatives. Further, the same competitive forces are reshaping state
corporate taxes to operate more like taxes on consumption than the traditional focus on taxing
corporate production. In addition, states are seeking to broaden the set of business taxpayers to
include those exploiting the state’s market and noncorporate businesses. (JEL H7, H20, H71)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Regional Economic Development, 2010, 6(1), pp. 88-101.
1 Some gambling revenues in Figure 1 are in the “Other Sales” 
category.
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to raise rates or broaden taxation to these alternative
sources of revenue. Indeed, states have frequently
raised their cigarette tax rates or broadened taxation
to new forms of gambling, though these changes
have not been concentrated solely during the recent
recession.
In this paper I examine some of the alternatives
to the three major taxes in terms of the character-
istics of a good tax system: efficiency, adequacy,
and equity. I focus almost entirely on state govern-
ments, since local governments generate little tax
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Specifically, I concentrate on (i) selective sales
taxes, such as those on alcohol, tobacco, and gam-
bling, and (ii) business gross receipts taxes. Each
of these taxes is primarily levied by state govern-
ments, so most of the paper focuses on the overall
picture of state revenue sources. Having said this,
state transfers to local governments represented
33.5 percent of local general revenues in 2007;
such transfers were 86.8 percent as large as taxes.
So, state revenue decisions are likely to have
important implications for local governments.2
The remainder of the paper consists of five
sections. The first section provides a brief descrip-
tion of local taxes. The next three address gross
receipts taxes, gambling taxes, and tobacco and
alcohol taxes. The final section provides a conclu-
sion and further discussion.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX
SOURCES
Property taxes dominate local tax revenues;
combined sales and income taxes generate less than
one-fifth of total tax collections. Thirty-five states
permit local sales taxes and 14 allow local income
taxes. Because of their relatively modest contribu-
tion to collections and the small number of states
permitting local sales and local income taxes, these
taxes are probably best seen as alternative taxes at
the local level rather than as potential significant
sources of revenue. Reliance on these sources varies
significantly across the country. Local governments
in some states (such as Arkansas and Louisiana)
and some large cities (such as New York City and
Philadelphia) use sales or income taxes heavily,
but many other states and cities raise little revenue
from these taxes. Hotel/motel taxes raise modest
revenue in many cities, and a number of jurisdic-
tions increased these taxes during the recession.
An excellent recent conference hosted by the
Lincoln Institute on Land Policy examined local
revenue sources in greater detail and considered
some of the options available for local governments
and private associations.3 Among these are tax
increment financing, business improvement dis-
tricts, and community facilities districts. One obser-
vation is that many of these variants on the major
taxes are better seen as ways to earmark revenue
rather than as new revenue sources.
Local governments to some extent offset limited
tax options by relying more on user fees. As Table 1
shows, states raise a greater share of their total
revenues with taxes and local governments make
up for the difference with more emphasis on user
fees. Various charges, including for hospitals, edu-
cation, and sewerage, account for just over one-
fourth of local general revenues.4 Local utility
revenues, which are not included in total revenues
in the table, are about half as large as local current
charges, adding further to the reliance on user fees.
State and local governments rely similarly on mis-
cellaneous revenues.
Fox
2 See state and local government finance statistics at
www.census.gov/govs/estimate/index.html.
Table 1
Revenue Shares by Level of Government (2006-07)
Revenue type State government Local government Total
Tax revenue 73.7 62.2 68.5
Current charges 13.7 25.2 18.9
Miscellaneous revenue 12.6 12.6 12.6
Total 100 100 100
NOTE: Revenue shares are expressed as percents.
3 See Ingram and Hong (2010).
4 General revenues include taxes and charges and exclude utility 
revenues, liquor state revenues, and insurance trust revenues.Fox
to impose a greater percentage of the tax on a desti-
nation basis.5 A 100 percent sales factor apportion-
ment formula allocates a company’s tax burden
among states according to gross receipts, so these
taxes have some similarities to GRTs (Figure 3).
Various states are also considering adoption of
net receipts taxes (NRTs). The distinction between
NRTs and GRTs is that the former allow deductions
for certain purchases and normally for the purchase
of intermediate goods. For example, last year’s
California tax commission proposed an NRT.
Rhode Island’s governor recently recommended
an NRT but withdrew his recommendation in late
January. The Texas and Michigan tax structures lie
between a GRT and an NRT.6
GROSS RECEIPTS TAXES
This section includes a discussion of gross and
net receipts taxes and how they differ from sales
taxes and an analysis of these taxes.
Understanding Net and Gross Receipts
Taxes
Gross receipts taxes (GRTs), levies imposed on
every transaction, have a long history among U.S.
states. Several states, including Washington and
Delaware, have maintained GRTs for many years.
Other states, such as Indiana and West Virginia,
replaced GRTs with other forms of business taxes
several decades ago. Three states, Michigan, Ohio,
and Texas, have added variants of GRTs in more
recent years. A number of states continue to discuss
the possibility of adding GRTs. Further, many states
have increased the weight on the sales factor in their
corporate income tax (CIT) apportionment formula


















































Sales Factor Apportionment (2008)
NOTE: White states either have no corporate income tax or allow equal weight on the sales factor.
5 At least nine states have now moved the situsing of sales of services
for the sales factor to a destination basis, consistent with the treat-
ment of goods.
6 For example, the Michigan tax allows deductions for purchases of
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an advantage of GRTs compared with the CIT.
GRTs are also perceived as entailing lower com-
pliance and administrative costs than the CIT,
since the GRT requires measurement of only gross
receipts, not of profits. The GRT base is effectively
the numerator in the CIT apportionment formula.
Thus, the Ohio GRT return was created the size of
a postcard. NRTs entail additional complexity and
likely require apportionment because of the diffi-
culty of tracking where deductions are to be attrib-
uted. This issue is addressed in more detail later
in the text.
Alternatively, rather than allow deductions, as
is permitted with NRTs, some states (for example,
Washington and Texas have multiple rates and
allow deductions) have adopted multiple tax rates,
with higher rates generally on industries that pro-
duce items that are sold primarily to final markets
or have fewer production steps. The use of multiple
tax rates imposes somewhat higher administrative
and compliance costs as decisions must be made
on the tax rate that applies to each type of commod-
ity or each firm. In Washington State, for example,
the same firm may sell goods and services in more
than one of the 28 classifications and be subject to
multiple tax rates (though the same tax rates some-
times apply to more than one classification). Further,
the economic distortions with a multiple-rate GRT
may be similar to those with a single-rate GRT.
Economists raise several key efficiency issues
with GRTs and generally argue that they are poor
tax instruments. GRTs can cascade unevenly into
input and output prices since they are levied at
every stage of the production process. This cascad-
ing distorts relative prices compared with a uniform
tax.9 A Washington State study measured the degree
of cascading from a GRT (defined as the effective
tax rate on an industry divided by the actual tax
rate) for a range of different industries.10 On average
the effective rate was 2.5 times the stated tax rate,
but the degree of cascading varied from 6.7 times
for industries such as food manufacturing and
petroleum refining to 1.4 times for data processing.
Washington’s decision to use multiple rates, with
a general tendency for lower rates on input costs,
Policymakers have generally viewed GRTs as
options for taxing business rather than as sales taxes
intended to be paid by consumers, though the sales
taxes in some states, such as New Mexico, are called
GRTs. Admittedly, the differences between sales
taxes as imposed in the United States and GRTs
are modest in some respects, particularly as the
latter have been structured in recent years. Sales
taxes have traditionally allowed two major exemp-
tions—sales for resale and component parts of
manufactured goods—both of which are taxable
under GRTs. The deductions allowed under an
NRT and a sales tax are more difficult to distinguish,
but the set of deductions would be much broader
under the NRT since it would allow exemption of
all intermediate input purchases.
GRTs have often been imposed on an origina-
tion basis and sales taxes on a destination basis.7
For example, Washington State taxes transactions
based on the seller’s location. Sales taxes are gen-
erally due where goods are shipped (the point of
destination), not the point from which the goods
are shipped (the point of origination). The states
that recently adopted GRTs have all imposed these
taxes on a destination basis, again making the GRT
more parallel to a sales tax.
States have implemented GRTs for a variety of
reasons but generally as a replacement for other
taxes, particularly income-based corporate taxes.
The new Michigan GRT was intended to partially
replace the single business tax that had previously
been eliminated. Also, GRTs are seen as a means of
taxing a broader set of firms than is possible with
CITs since GRTs are imposed on unincorporated
businesses, nonprofitable firms, and businesses
protected by PL 86-272.8 GRTs are also a way to tax
the service sector—something that has proven elu-
sive through the sales tax in many states—since
service producers would also be liable for the tax.
Evaluating Gross Receipts Taxes
Some consider the ability to extend taxation
to a broader set of taxpayers and to some services
7 This distinction is true for sales taxes on goods. Sales taxes on 
services have often been levied on an origination basis.
8 PL 86-272 is a federal preemption that prevents states from imposing
a CIT on firms whose only relationship with a state is solicitation of
orders for the sale of tangible personal property. PL 86-272 applies
only to income-based taxes.
9 Neither the sales tax nor the CIT is uniform across all commodities.
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should lessen the extent of cascading relative to a
fixed-rate GRT, though this entails the compliance
costs described previously. The Washington data
should account for the effects of multiple tax rates
on cascading. Washington has had a GRT for many
years, so the extent of cascading there includes how
firms have adapted their behavior to the tax.
The incentives to produce and consume are
altered as the cascading tax changes relative prices,
which leads to economic inefficiencies. The differ-
ential propensity for the tax to cascade raises rela-
tive production costs for industries such as food
manufacturing and presumably encourages produc-
tion in Washington of more lightly taxed industries
relative to more heavily taxed industries. Firms can
limit the extent of cascading taxes to some degree
by vertical integration. But economic inefficiencies
also arise to the extent that firms are induced to
vertically integrate to lessen the taxation of inter-
mediate inputs, rather than because it represents
more efficient business practice. Firms that verti-
cally integrate should be able to limit the extent of
tax cascading and thereby gain a competitive advan-
tage that helps keep their production costs low.
However, decisions to vertically integrate when it
is not the best business practice, other than for tax
savings, entail efficiency losses to the economy.
Economists generally prefer the CIT, which is
often seen as the alternative to the GRT, under the
expectation that the CIT does not incur the effi-
ciency disadvantages created by the GRT. In some
cases, this perspective may arise because the CIT
is evaluated in an ideal setting, not as the tax actu-
ally operates. The CIT introduces its own distor-
tions, and more careful analysis suggests that the
distortions of the GRT relative to the CIT may not
be as great as has been implicit in discussions about
these taxes. The actual state CIT is apportioned for
about 70 percent of the revenue received by states.
This apportionment can be better viewed as a tax
on the factors in the formula—payroll, property,
and sales. As states increase the weight on the sales
factor, the tax moves toward a point where the
burden across states is allocated on the basis of
gross receipts—that is, the tax operates much like
a sales tax on corporations. Arithmetically, distri-
bution of the burden based on gross receipts cre-
ates some incentive for vertical integration, albeit
smaller than with the GRT.11
The CIT is a tax on payroll and property to the
extent that these factors are weighted in the appor-
tionment formula, potentially creating distortions
not introduced by the GRT. In addition, recent
analysis of industry structure more intensely ques-
tions some of the conventional wisdom on the
economic inefficiencies of GRTs compared with
CITs. Yang (2010a) finds that GRTs may provide
an incentive for firms to vertically integrate, but
this depends on the extent to which intermediate
good pricing in the upstream market is affected by
the fall in demand that occurs with imposition of
the GRT in the downstream market. The GRT may
discourage vertical integration if upstream prices
are flexible enough to move downward in response
to the tax. Some recent research suggests that the
extent of vertical integration is less than has often
been thought (Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2009). Yang
(2010a) also finds that GRTs may allow profits in
the upstream state to be shifted to the downstream
state (assuming the firms are in different states),
which can increase the well-being of the down-
stream state—albeit at the expense of the upstream
state—so that national welfare is likely reduced.
Also, GRTs do not create an incentive to alter a com-
pany’s legal structure, as is encouraged by the CIT.
GRTs should be more difficult to avoid than
CITs since firms can plan for taxes only by altering
where items are sold, not by changing their meas-
ured profits. Firms are unlikely to choose not to
sell in a state merely to avoid a low rate tax.12 They
do, however, alter their measured profits by chang-
ing their corporate structure, moving production
to low-tax states, and making decisions to avoid
establishing corporate nexus, such as is possible
through PL 86-272. This limitation from PL 86-272
applies only to income-based taxes.
No careful studies exist on the winners and
losers from the cascading process, though the expec-
Fox
11 Personal correspondence with Dave Merriman, November 2007.
12 Origin-based taxes distort cross-state producer prices and destination-
based taxes distort cross-state consumer (or buyer) prices. The
assumption is that distortions in producer prices across states have
greater implications for efficiency than distortions in consumer prices
across states. This assumption may become less reasonable as Internet
sales grow if states cannot enforce destination-based taxes.tation is that heavy buyers of items with the great-
est cascading bear the greatest tax burdens. The
propensity for GRTs to cascade alters both hori-
zontal and vertical equity since the tax implicit in
each final sale depends on the extent of cascading
and the ability to shift these taxes into consumer
prices.
At first blush, the NRTs are expected to elimi-
nate the distortions in relative prices and incentives
for vertical integration that arise from GRTs because
the tax appears to be a destination value-added tax
(VAT). The tax is a VAT if all sales are totally within
a single state and would be neutral on all factors.
However, NRTs do not serve as VATs when sales
occur across state borders; the tax is imposed on a
destination basis and deductions are allowed for
purchases of intermediate goods by both in-state
and out-of-state firms selling in the state (or in-state
firms selling out of state). Border adjustments,
which occur with VATs around the world, are nec-
essary to ensure that cross-state transactions are
treated neutrally on a destination basis. However,
the only adjustment for the selling firm with an NRT
is for purchases from the immediately preceding
input providers in the production chain. As a result,
the NRT state tax liability implicit in any sales from
out-of-state firms will be only on the value added
from the selling firm plus any additional value
added in the NRT state. So, the NRT base on cross-
state sales will often be less than the full value of
a good or service, whereas the full value should
be taxable when all production in the chain is in
state. Tax will also be implicit in sales from firms
in the NRT state to out-of-state buyers to the extent
that there is any value added by firms earlier in the
production chain in the NRT state. Thus, firms can
avoid tax by undertaking all earlier steps in the
production process in a state with lower taxes or
by vertically integrating.
Firms also can potentially lower their tax lia-
bility by creating a sales corporation in a non-NRT
state for purposes of selling in an NRT state. The
firm would then sell to the sales corporation, take
a deduction for the value of this intermediate trans-
action, and resell in the NRT state. Both firms in
the NRT state and firms in other states can lessen
their tax liability by creating sales corporations.
The bottom line is that NRTs (i) do not operate as
VATs, (ii) create inefficiencies that are difficult to
assess, and (iii) have not been carefully analyzed
at this time (see Bankman et al., 2009).
GRTs should perform well in adequacy terms.
As a general rule, the breadth of the base with both
a gross and net tax allows substantial revenue to
be raised at rates that are very low compared with
those levied on corporate profits. Revenue-neutral
rates on a broad NRT can probably be in the 2 per-
cent range and on gross receipts can be much lower.
For example, Texas levied a 0.5 percent rate GRT
and Ohio imposed a 0.26 percent rate GRT. The
revenue-neutral rates must be higher to the extent
that additional exemptions or deductions are per-
mitted under a true NRT. The new Texas tax has
underperformed expectations but it was created
with three alternative deductions, which makes it
difficult to anticipate the revenues.
Tax revenues with both the NRT and the GRT
should grow over time with economic activity. No
measures of the revenue elasticities with respect
to economic activity have been developed as yet
for GRTs and NRTs, but they should be close to 1
(Ohio estimated the elasticity as slightly less than 1)
unless there are strong trend changes in the number
of steps in the overall economic production chain.
Also, state policy decisions to narrow the base could
lower the long-term revenue growth. CITs had very
poor revenue performance during the 1990s and
into the early 2000s, but the revenues grew very
rapidly during the later stages of the economic
expansion of the 2000s. GRTs are expected to be
more stable than CITs, since the volatility of total
sales is expected to be much lower than the volatil-
ity of corporate profits.
GAMBLING TAXES
States rely relatively heavily on imposing a
series of selective excises on goods and services
that are considered unique options for taxation.
Alcohol, gasoline, and tobacco products have
long been the focal point for specialized taxation.
Gambling has become a target during the past 45
years as states continue to expand options for
gambling. Experience of the past decades suggests
that taxpayers find excises on these sources (or at
least increases in these taxes) more politically
Fox
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palatable than broad-based taxes. Perhaps people
find “sin taxes” acceptable or consider taxes on
these commodities more “voluntary” than broad-
based taxes. The next two sections focus on taxa-
tion of gambling and alcohol and tobacco. Gasoline
taxes are not considered here since the revenue is
frequently earmarked for road usage and changes
in the rates and bases have been less common than
for gambling and tobacco taxes.
The contribution to state finance by the range
of selective excise taxes has diminished dramati-
cally over the past 60 years. Combined, these taxes
raised 40 percent of state tax collections in 1947
but only about 15 percent in 2007. The share has
continued to fall over the past 15 years despite the
frequency with which some tax rates have been
increased.
States have moved broadly into taxation of
gambling since New Hampshire adopted the first
modern lottery in 1964. Every state except Hawaii
and Utah now allows and taxes some form of gam-
bling. Today, 43 states operate lotteries, 11 of which
have been adopted since 1991.13 Twelve states
allow commercial lotteries, five of which have
been adopted since 1991. Since 1991, racinos
(race tracks with casinos) have been permitted in
12 states. In addition, 43 states allow parimutuel
gambling and 32 have gambling at Native American
facilities. Lotteries raise almost three-fourths of
state gambling tax revenues and casinos raise
another 20 percent. Parimutuels and racinos gen-
erate modest shares, though the racino share has
increased in recent years with growth in the num-
ber of venues and states that allow them.
States continue to adopt new forms of gambling
or to allow gambling at new or expanded facilities
as sources for additional revenue. For example,
Kentucky’s governor has proposed adoption of
racinos, Illinois has proposed outsourcing the lot-
tery, Pennsylvania is permitting casino gambling,
and other states are seeking ways to use the Internet
to expand gambling. Despite these increases, gam-
bling has remained a near-constant share of total
state tax revenues for some years—between 2.1
and 2.5 percent.
Gambling taxes have exhibited mixed perform-
ance in adequacy terms.14 The revenues appear to
be relatively stable; the first decline in at least three
decades occurred in 2009. The 2.6 percent fall in
gambling revenues in 2009 was small compared
with the total state tax revenue decline of 8.3 per-
cent and the personal income tax decrease of 13.6
percent during 2009, suggesting less instability
than the larger state tax revenue sources.
Both major gambling sources have exhibited
some revenue volatility in recessions. Growth rates
for lottery revenue alone have generally decreased
over the past several decades and revenues actually
fell in 2001 and 2002 and declined again, at least
in 2009 and possibly 2010. Casino revenues appear
to have decreased during both 2008 and 2009.
Casino revenues adjust relatively rapidly to norms
when revenues perform below equilibrium, such
as during a recession. This suggests that gambling
revenues may resume their growth sooner in post-
recession periods than sales and income taxes
(Nichols and Tosun, 2008).
Perhaps more troubling is that the growth trend
for gambling tax revenue has been modest com-
pared with other taxes, such as personal income
and sales taxes. This suggests a low, long-term
revenue elasticity. Gambling tax revenues rose
somewhat more slowly than the average tax source
from 1998 through 2008, and much of the increase
in gambling revenues has resulted from new games
or new states legalizing various forms of gambling.
In the past decade, at least six states added lotteries,
six added racinos, and one allowed casino gam-
bling. Dadayan and Ward (2009) find that gambling
revenues grew much more slowly than other tax
sources if the effect of new entrants is excluded.15
Empirical analysis by Garrett and Coughlin
(2009) is consistent with slow lottery revenue
growth. They note that lottery revenues peaked in
West Virginia in 1999 and have not grown in real
per capita terms in Iowa since 1977. Nichols and
Tosun (2009) examined long-run and short-run
revenue elasticities for casino revenue. They found
Fox
13 See Dadayan (2009). 
14 The discussion of performance of gambling revenue draws heavily
from Dadayan and Ward (2009).
15 Of course, some of the change in tax revenues from other sources
can also be attributed to higher rates.that long-run elasticities are initially relatively
high—between those for income and sales taxes—
when states first adopt casinos. However, the elas-
ticities fall over time and are lower than for both
income and sales taxes for more mature markets,
such as Atlantic City and Nevada. The revenue data
suggest that states will find it difficult to maintain
the share of revenue provided by gambling unless
new forms can be found in coming years.
Previous research has focused on gambling tax
revenues and not net new revenues to the govern-
ment. The increase in revenue that a state can
obtain from higher gambling taxes can be deter-
mined only in a general equilibrium setting since
employment and other effects also occur with the
adoption of gambling. The net effect of legalizing
gambling and imposing a tax or raising gambling
tax rates will probably be smaller than the revenues
generated by the tax. The expenditures on gambling
by in-state residents are not available for other pur-
poses, which presumably means lower revenues
from sales and excise taxes. Additional revenue
could be obtained from cross-border gamblers but
the potential for most states to benefit from cross-
border gambling is limited. Interestingly, adoption
of gambling in neighboring states appears to have
little effect on the income elasticity of gambling in
the home state (Garrett and Coughlin, 2009), which
suggests that policy changes in neighboring states
have little effect on the gambling revenue in the
home state.
The efficiency consequences of gambling taxes,
as with taxes on alcohol and tobacco, are a compli-
cated function of the distortions in individual con-
sumption behavior caused by imposition of the tax
(that is, the reduction in consumption caused by the
price increase resulting from imposition of the tax)
and the social effects from consumption of the com-
modities. The efficiency effects become even more
complicated when aggressive government adver-
tising to encourage consumption is taken into
account. State legalization of gambling in forms
that may be more addictive, such as casinos rather
than lotteries, potentially increases the social con-
sequences. This paper is focused on the revenue-
raising effects of taxes, so the broader set of social
consequences associated with consumption of the
taxed goods and services is not addressed here.
Most of the related research on gambling is
specific to lotteries, so much of the following
analysis applies specifically to lotteries. Tax rates
on gambling, and particularly lotteries, are often
very high. For example, the net proceeds available
to state governments from lotteries average 23.5
percent of total expenditures and 26.6 percent if
administrative expenditures are added to the pro-
ceeds.16 This is consistent with an average tax rate
between 31 and 36 percent on lotteries, a very high
tax rate compared with rates often imposed on other
activities. The resulting distortion in relative prices
can entail significant losses in economic well-being
(by reducing gambling) with two exceptions: The
efficiency losses associated with high tax rates are
much smaller if consumption is relatively unre-
sponsive to price and if the tax is intended to limit
the negative social consequences by discouraging
gambling.
This paper focuses on the revenue side of
government, not how the tax revenue is used.
However, research on lotteries provides an excep-
tion that should be considered. Theoretical research
indicates that lotteries elicit higher levels of public
expenditures than do other voluntary mechanisms
to support public services. High lottery tax rates
may also not be as distortive if players are partici-
pating because they expect to receive benefits from
the expenditures or they value the additional
finance for public service provision—in simpler
terms, consumption may not be decreased as much
as anticipated by the tax. For example, Landry and
Price (2007) find that lottery expenditures are
higher when the revenues are earmarked for edu-
cation. They interpret this as meaning that lottery
players are taking the education expenditures into
consideration when choosing to participate in the
lottery. Further, they find that casino gambling is
a substitute for the lottery in states where the pro-
ceeds go into the general fund, but not in states
where the funds are earmarked for education. This
suggests that players in earmark states consider
the education benefits associated with the lottery
and not merely the love of gambling when they
choose to play the lottery. Further, Landry and
Fox
96 VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
16 For income and apportionment of state-administered lottery funds
by state for 2008, see www2.census.gov/govs/state/08lottery.pdf.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1 2010 97
Price (2007) find that lottery receipts rise in states
where the proceeds to education are a greater share
of the expenditures.
Gambling taxes are generally seen as regres-
sive, though research indicates that the extent of
regressiveness can vary by type of game and over
time. For example, Miyazaki, Hansen, and Sprott
(1998) find that most lotteries are regressive. More
recent research by Garrett and Coughlin (2009)
concludes that lotteries are regressive, though the
degree of regressivity changes over time. The extent
of regressiveness is generally observed to depend
on the game. Perhaps surprisingly, the regressive-
ness of online games is similar to that for other
instant games. Large jackpot games are less regres-
sive than smaller games, such as instant games.
Oster (2004) finds that lotteries become less regres-
sive as the size of the jackpot rises and suggests
that lotteries might even become progressive at
very high payouts.
A small set of gamblers is often responsible for
a substantial share of consumption (though this
may be less true for lotteries than for other forms
of gambling). Thus, the incidence on the median
and many low-income households can be much
smaller than on the average household. This may
lessen the implications of regressiveness on low-
income households but emphasizes the propensity
of gambling taxes to be on addictive behavior.
ALCOHOL AND CIGARETTE TAXES
State and local alcohol and tobacco taxes raised
$21.5 billion in FY 2007. These taxes are imposed
almost exclusively by states since local governments
generate less than $1 billion from them. A wide
range of taxes is levied on these commodities, often
by type of product. Cigarettes, chewing tobacco,
beer, wine, and spirits are frequently taxed with
different rates and bases.
The underlying growth of these taxes is
expected to be slow since each is generally levied
on some form of quantity purchased rather than
value.17 At least in part to offset the slow underly-
ing growth rate, states have frequently increased
tobacco tax rates. Forty-six states and the District
of Columbia combined have raised cigarette tax
rates at least 100 times since 2000.18 Hawaii has
increased rates the most—nine times—but many
other states have raised rates multiple times. The
average year-end tobacco tax rate has grown from
about 20 cents per pack in 1989 to about $1.34 per
pack in 2009 (Figure 4).19 The federal tax rate was
increased to $1.01 per pack in 2009 so the com-
bined tax, including federal, state, and local rates,
reaches much higher.
State tobacco tax revenues have risen relatively
fast over the past 15 years and at approximately the
same rate as the individual income tax. But the
revenue increases have been mostly because of
the rate changes.20 Still, revenues have not risen
nearly as fast as tax rates have been increased,
suggesting higher rates have significantly lowered
the number of taxed packs that are purchased and
likely has changed where they are purchased.
Some alcohol tax rates have also been
increased in recent years but much less frequently
than those for tobacco products. Further, alcohol
taxes generate a much lower share of total tax rev-
enue than tobacco taxes. Alcohol raises only about
26 percent of state combined tax revenues.
As with gambling taxes, understanding the
efficiency effects of alcohol taxes is affected by a
given state’s multiple taxation goals, including
discouraging smoking or alcohol consumption,
paying for the health care costs associated with
smoking or drinking, and collecting general rev-
enues on a relatively price-inelastic commodity.
Views of how the revenues should be spent also
differ. For example, those concerned with reduc-
ing consumption of alcohol or tobacco products
often lobby for the additional tax revenue to be
earmarked for anti-consumption programs.
Much of the related research is on cigarette
taxes, so most of the following discussion applies
specifically to cigarettes. Tobacco tax rates have
Fox
17 A number of exceptions exist, such as Tennessee’s mixed drink tax.
18 See www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/cig_inc02.html for cigarette tax
increases from 2000 to 2010.
19 See www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0097.pdf for
state cigarette excise tax rates and rankings.
20 State tobacco tax revenues contain revenues from all tobacco prod-
ucts, including cigarettes, cigars, and chewing tobacco.become high relative to the pretax price, which
could create important distortions in consumption
behavior. State cigarette tax rates vary substantially
across states, from 17 cents per pack in Missouri
to $3.46 per pack in Rhode Island. Tobacco tax
rates can easily exceed 100 percent on the pretax
price when taxes at all levels are combined. The
American Heart Association, which served as an
advocate for many of the tax rates increases, is
pleased that cigarette sales have diminished, but
state fiscal planners may not appreciate the impact
on revenues.
Rate differentials create the potential for signifi-
cant bootlegging and increased cross-border sales.
Lovenheim (2008) finds that between 13 and 25
percent of consumers purchase cigarettes in lower-
tax states or on Native American reservations. As
a result, cigarette consumption is relatively unre-
sponsive to home state price increases (such as
those associated with tax rate hikes). Indeed, con-
sumption may actually increase in some cases as tax
rates rise and home state consumers increase out-
of-state purchases. So, home state tax rate increases
may not decrease consumption and may have little
effect on revenues since smuggling and cross-state
purchasing rise with the tax rate increases.
Thursby and Thursby (2000) conclude that
commercial smuggling accounted for about 4 per-
cent of cigarette sales in the 1970s and subsequently
declined as tax rate differentials fell. They also find
that higher federal tax rates increased smuggling.
The recent spate of tax rate increases and resulting
wide diversity of rates suggest that smuggling may
be growing again. Slemrod (2007) has argued that
policy changes that reduce smuggling may be effec-
tive in helping states achieve the objectives of less
consumption and more revenue, since these are
means of enforcing destination taxation on ciga-
rettes. The Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (PACT)
Act of 2009 requires vendors to collect excise taxes
on cigarettes that are delivered. This requirement
should limit the extent of bootlegging and cross-
border shopping.
Joint ownership of cigarette tax bases by the
federal and state governments suggests that tax
rate decisions by one level of government can affect
the other. Tax rate increases by one level of govern-
ment reduce the base taxed by that level (as con-
sumption decreases and/or illegal sales increase)
and create a vertical externality as the other level
of government also faces a smaller base and reduced
tax revenue. The non–rate-increasing government
Fox
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could choose to raise or lower its rate in response
to the fall in tax revenues. A higher rate would be
intended to offset the revenue loss and a lower rate
to keep the taxable base from shrinking.
Much of the research on the vertical relation-
ships between federal and state governments has
been aimed at cigarette taxes because the rates are
easy to specify and some of the other necessary
data for the analysis are available, but there has
also been research on other taxes. Studies across
several different taxes have often found a positive
relationship, suggesting that states raise their tax
rates as the federal government increases its tax
rates (see Deveraux, Lockwood, and Reoano, 2007,
and Yang, 2010b, for examples of cigarette taxes).
But the results are not fully consistent. Fredriksson
and Mamun (2008) find a tendency for states to
lower their cigarette tax rates as the federal govern-
ment increases its rate (there is a negative vertical
reaction function). As a result, they find that state
tax revenues decline as the federal tax rate increases,
both because states lower their rates (relative to
what they otherwise would be) and the federal rate
increase reduces the taxable base.
Similarly, horizontal relationships can exist
because one state’s tax rate increase can affect
another state’s tendency to raise or lower its tax
rate. The expectation is that a neighboring state’s
rate increase should raise the home state’s revenues
since the neighboring state’s rate increase would
encourage additional cross-border shopping by
out-of-state buyers (or less cross-border purchasing
in the neighboring state should its rate be lower).
The home state could reduce its tax rate because
of the additional revenues it receives from more
cross-border shopping or raise its rate because it
can now do so without fear of creating losses from
reduced purchases within its borders. Research
has generally found that states use increases in
neighboring states as “cover” to raise their own
tax rates (the horizontal reaction function is posi-
tive), so the home state also raises its rates. This
response could also be seen as a yardstick effect.
Not surprisingly, research has found that con-
sumers are more likely to bear a federal cigarette
tax rate increase than a state rate hike (Barnett,
Keeler, and Hu, 1995). Simply, consumers are better
able to find alternative places to buy cigarettes
that are not subject to a rate hike imposed by a
single state than by the federal government. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
History tells us that states will continue to
change policy related to alcohol, tobacco, and
gaming. More states will allow broader access to
gambling and will continue to impose taxes on
the newly adopted games. Alcohol and tobacco
tax rates will rise further. However, competition
between states for gambling and sales of alcohol
and tobacco will likely make it increasingly difficult
for rates to rise dramatically higher. Cross-border
shopping and bootlegging have grown and will
limit states’ ability to push tax rates dramatically
higher even as the PACT Act assists states in impos-
ing cigarette taxes. As a result, revenues from these
sources will rise in nominal terms but at best will
remain flat and in all likelihood will fall relative
to total state tax revenues over the longer term—
continuing the decades-long pattern.
States will also continue to examine options
for altering business taxes. The jury is still out on
the best ways to tax businesses at the state level.
The underlying impetus for business tax policy
changes appears to be lower taxes on production
(taxes at the origin) to enhance economic develop-
ment. States have also sought to expand the set of
tax-paying businesses to reduce the burdens on
heavy manufacturing and to ensure that “out-of-
state” and “in-state” firms are taxed more evenly.
States have used two principal methods to achieve
these objectives: reforming the CIT and adopting
new tax instruments. Taxation at the source or origin
with the CIT has been reduced by increasing the
weight on the sales factor in the formula and alter-
ing the situsing provision for sales of services to a
destination basis. These changes effectively cause
the CIT to operate more like a sales tax (though only
on profitable corporations), suggesting that these
methods are possible ways to mask increases in
the sales tax. Of course, states have made other
reforms/changes, such as greater reliance on com-
bined reporting, but it is less clear how these alter
the extent of taxation at the source. Some states
have also expanded the CIT to include other busi-
Foxness structures, most notably limited liability
corporations.
Another approach taken by states has been the
adoption of new structures such as GRTs or NRTs.
These tax structures are more easily expanded to
noncorporate businesses, unprofitable firms, and
out-of-state firms selling within a state. In many
cases, these taxes are built into prices in the desti-
nation state so they also operate as sales taxes,
although GRTs are likely to cascade more than sales
taxes. Many other effects of these taxes require
additional study before states go too far down this
road.
Cross-state competition sustains pressure on
states’ ability to tax at the origin, making it likely
that transitions in business taxation will continue.
Fiscal stresses from the recession may slow some
changes that otherwise would occur, but these
will not curtail the longer-term trend toward taxes
on consumers rather than producers. Elimination
of corporate taxes is an option well worth consid-
ering that states have not seriously addressed yet.
Explicit, broad-based sales taxes at flat rates are a
better tax policy than a sales tax imposed through
the CIT veil.
Fox
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